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of thought, we might dismiss our question without further answer. If, however, we seek for a positive rebuttal, we find facts enough at our disposal. Unpleasant experience may be avoided not only by action but also by inaction; and the 'avoiding' reaction itself may be of two kinds, withdrawal or attack and conquest; and, yet again, unpleasant experience may be overcome, and thus in effect avoided, by habit. Moreover, the unpleasant may have to be sought, as means to a remoter end. And finally there is case upon case of inevitable pain (incurable disease), of pain whose avoidance is impossible. The biological theory breaks down.

What, secondly, of the pathological character of unpleasurable feeling? Is such feeling always a symptom of organic lack or damage? The author argues the question to a negative result in what is, to the reviewer's mind, one of the best reasoned chapters of his study. He takes up, in order, the topics of bodily discomfort (here he befalls the issue, to some extent, by a confusion of pain as feeling with pain as sensation) and of emotional or 'moral' pains and disagreeableness. Under the latter heading he points out, *e. g.*, that in the course of an hour's reading one may have had an almost unbroken succession of disagreements, aversions, irritations; vital disturbance, cerebral damage must, then, occur every minute or two! Moreover, it cannot be affirmed, on the other side, that pleasure means always an enhancement of life; there are pleasures from chronic indulgence, pleasures of insanity, the euphoria of the death-bed. It must, therefore, be concluded that pleasure and pain are both alike normal phenomena, and that both swing within wide limits of intensive difference.

With these special considerations out of the way, we can proceed to a final formulation. Pleasantness and unpleasantness are qualitative opposites, normal and positive experiences. Pleasantness is the symptom or index of the fact that a mental process is suited for mental assimilation; unpleasantness, on the other hand, signifies that a mental process is unsuited for mental assimilation. This conclusion is wrought out in terms of Lipps's two "fundamental conditions of the psychical life," *Vereinheitlichung* and *Sonderung*. —

It is unfortunately inevitable that an ordered presentation of any psychological doctrine must, as things are, be couched in the language of some particular psychological system. The present writer is unable, on many fundamental points, to agree with Lipps. Hence it is but natural that the constructive part of the essay whose contents have been here outlined should seem to him less successful than its critical sections. It must, however, be said that a translation of the author's position into other terms is easily possible. As criticism, the essay is very certainly deserving of high praise. Dr. Nadejde has attacked an obvious and important problem which has been neglected, or at least but very partially treated, by his contemporaries. He has thus done a real service to scientific psychology. Such problems are, of course, not to be solved out of hand, and there will, without doubt, be reply and counter-reply and reply again. But, at any rate, a shrewd blow has been struck at the teleological interpretation of the feelings.

E. DANBY.

Philosophie der Werte: Grundzüge einer Weltanschauung, von HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1908. pp. viii, 486.

It was in 1808, exactly a century ago, that Johann Gottlieb Fichte issued his "Reden an die deutsche Nation." The tremendous influence of this work is well known. As Professor Münsterberg puts it, Fichte's "Weltanschauung war ein künstliches Denkgebilde, aber wieder bewährte es sich, dass der Idealismus des abstrakten Denkers

im Grunde die lebendigste und wirkungsvollste Lebensmacht ist. Sein reiner Glaube an die ewigen Werte ergriff die tiefste Seele des Volkes." But Fichte's idealism presently sank into disrepute, overwhelmed by the positivism of natural science. There was only one world, the world of observed fact; and all the 'riddles of the universe' were set by that and must be answered, if they could be answered at all, in terms of science itself, of elements and laws of occurrence. Then came the inevitable reaction against positivism, and the steady trend towards epistemology and away from metaphysics, that are characteristic of current philosophical thinking. Facts in themselves become tiresome; the thinker turns "zur Erkenntnisfrage, zur Frage nach dem Wert der wissenschaftlichen Behauptung;" he begins to enquire "nach Sinn und Bedeutung." So the concept of *value* is brought to the forefront of philosophical interest. A mere "Umwertung der Werte" is, however, not enough: we must, says Professor Münsterberg, push our investigation to "das tiefste Wesen der Bewertung." "Die Gesamtheit der Werte muss grundsätzlich geprüft und aus einer Grundtat einheitlich abgeleitet werden." What our latter-day philosophy lacks is "ein in sich geschlossenes System der reinen Werte;" only when we have this "kann die Philosophie auch wieder aufs neue zur wirklichen Lebensmacht werden, wie es zu lange ausschliesslich die Naturwissenschaft gewesen ist." Its provision is by no means easy, but rather a matter of keen and laborious thinking; it will not suffice "die grossen Gedanken des deutschen Idealismus noch einmal auszusprechen." Natural science has intervened; more especially "die Naturwissenschaft vom Seelischen, die Psychologie, hat ganz neue Ausblicke eröffnet; neue Wertgebiete des praktischen Lebens haben sich aufgetan; wir sind andere Menschen geworden." The day for reconstruction may, perhaps, not yet have arrived; but its arrival may be hastened.

In this spirit, the author lays before the public his own Philosophy of Values, which falls into two parts, a brief introductory theory of values and a system of values. The book is designed to turn our attention from laws to ideals, from the pleasurable and the useful to the sphere of pure duty, from material things to free will, from the world of facts to the world of eternal values. That it is a notable attempt goes without saying; it is the expression of a strongly marked personality, and shows a sustained fervor of conviction. Nevertheless, it is, in the fullest sense of the phrase, a "künstliches Denkgebilde;" and without running to the other extreme, of a raggedly pragmatic universe, we may surely say that the age of such systems is past. Individuals, men of like temperament with the author, will find in his pages inspiration and encouragement. All readers of the book will derive from it the benefit of a moral tonic. The circle of Professor Münsterberg's admirers will be increased. But that the doctrines which he sets forth will appeal, vitally and enduringly, to any large body of academic youth, whether in Germany or in the English-speaking world, seems hardly possible. The next reformation in thought must come from within the sciences, not from the external realm of concepts.

M. W. WISEMAN.

The Philosophy of Loyalty, by JOSIAH ROYCE. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1908. pp. xiii+409.

These lectures were first delivered in their present form before the Lowell Institute in the autumn of 1907, although their substance had been given in various places at other times. "It is simply an appeal to any reader who may be fond of ideals and who may also be willing to review his own ideals in a somewhat new light and in a philo-